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The majority of electronic commerce (e-commerce) research addresses markets 
and processes associated with the sale of products and services, which is clearly very 
important for developing a solid understanding in the field. This research draws from the 
disciplines of economics (e.g., market design, intermediation, pricing) and information 
systems (e.g., system design, Internet portals, software agents), and it benefits the 
practitioner as well as adding to our cumulative knowledge and understanding through 
research. But in comparison with research addressing product and service markets, an 
important area of e-commerce has been relatively neglected: employment markets. These 
latter employment markets offer potential to gain from e-commerce research as much as 
their product and service counterparts, and they similarly lend themselves to 
multidisciplinary investigation.  
The central task performed by employment markets involves matching people 
with jobs, and market mechanisms (e.g., balancing supply and demand through adjustable 
wages) help promote the efficient allocation of job seekers to the jobs making best use of 
their skills, and vice versa. Although such mechanisms mirror those found in most 
markets for goods and services, employment markets differ in a fundamental manner: 
two-sided matching. In matching people with jobs, for instance, the job seeker (i.e., the 
“good”) must want a particular job, in addition to the employer (i.e., the “consumer”) 
wanting to hire this specific person. In markets for goods and services, on the other hand, 
matching is generally one-sided. For instance, there is no requirement for a particular 
good (e.g., a hammer) to want a consumer (e.g., a carpenter), in addition to the consumer 
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 wanting to purchase the good. This difference complicates the design of employment 
markets. 
The introduction of information technology (IT) to enable electronic employment 
(e-employment) markets further adds to this design challenge. For instance, market 
efficiency depends upon good information (i.e., perfect, in theory), but employment 
markets are very information-intensive (e.g., consider the magnitude of relevant 
information pertaining to all jobs for software developers and all people with software-
development skills). Moreover, most IT tools currently available to employers and job 
seekers contribute little to mitigating the associated information overload (e.g., when a 
Web search engine returns 10,000 software-developer prospects). And although the 
recent emergence of more powerful IT tools, such as “intelligent” software agents, offers 
considerable promise in terms of helping boundedly rational people to search and filter 
through myriad job/employee prospects, important properties (e.g., market clearing) are 
difficult to ensure through such technologically enabled market designs. 
This technical report builds upon multidisciplinary research in labor market 
economics and information systems, and it involves an exploratory experiment to assess 
the performance of five alternative market designs. Employing a quasi-price measure for 
comparison and examining social welfare as a basis for assessing market-design 
alternatives, we provide novel insight into the balance required between technologically 
enabled efficiency and economically principled effectiveness of markets. And through 
experimentation, we systematically evaluate the relative performance of diverse market-
design alternatives (e.g., with and without IT support, distributed software agent 
automation, centralized algorithms for two-sided matching and optimization).  
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 Additionally, this experiment addresses labor market economics in a difficult, 
public-sector context, in which the concept profit has no bearing, and microeconomic 
constructs such as marginal revenue and marginal cost fail to capture many critical 
employment market considerations (e.g., employer and employee preferences). Yet the 
market designs and associated technologies are quite general, so the experiment also 
provides insight into private-sector markets. Indeed, extension to for-profit firms and 
labor in industry represents a simpler, more-restrictive case of the market designs 
examined in this investigation.  
The balance of the technical report follows this introduction by highlighting key 
aspects of employment market economics, after which we outline the kind of software 
agent technology now emerging from the laboratory to enable a new generation of e-
employment markets. We then discuss the two-sided assignment model in some detail, 
and we lay out the experimental design. Experimental results are then summarized in 
turn, and we close the technical report by discussing key conclusions and topics for 
continued research along the lines of this investigation. 
BACKGROUND 
As background we summarize key concepts and research upon which this 
technical report builds. This summary includes three areas: 1) labor market economics, 2) 




 Labor Market Economics 
For relevant background in this section, we highlight key points from what is now 
textbook economics (Ehrenberg and Smith 1997). Two modes of matching people with 
jobs prevail at present: 1) distributed markets and 2) hierarchical planning. Mirroring 
most markets for goods and services, the former approach supports distributed, point-to-
point matching between job seekers and employers. Such, market-based labor markets 
balance demand and supply through dynamic wage adjustment. They also allocate labor 
to its highest valued uses (i.e., demand efficiency) and to the uses for which each 
employee is best-suited or most willing to work (i.e., supply efficiency). Further, 
compensating wage differentials ensure balance across industries. In this sense, market-
based labor markets maximize social welfare, which is traditionally measured as the area 
between the labor demand and supply curves, for the quantity of labor hired (i.e., the 
shaded area in Figure 1). Despite these positive properties, however, the market-based 
approach is seldom used for employee/job matching within modern enterprises, and 












Figure 1. Market-Based Labor Markets 
 
Alternatively, patterned after centrally planned economies (e.g., the former Soviet 
Union) and command-and-control organizations (e.g., the military, government, large 
corporations), the latter approach involves administrative procedures to match people 
with jobs. Hierarchical job assignments rely upon the cognitive processes of centralized, 
administrative professionals to match individual capabilities and job requirements and to 
reflect both the job’s relative priority and the individual’s job preferences. This provides 
management with tremendous control over when and where specific employees change 
jobs within the enterprise. But the hierarchical approach is seldom used for employee/job 
matching between modern enterprises, and the centralized matching process lacks many 
benefits of its market-based counterpart (e.g., market clearing, demand and supply 
efficiencies).  
Thus, distributed market and hierarchical planning approaches each have relative 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of employer/job seeker matching. In the present 
research, we investigate an approach that incorporates the best features of both markets 
and hierarchies in designing employment markets. As suggested in the introduction, 
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 two—non-mutually exclusive—approaches are considered: 1) two-sided matching 
markets and 2) software agent technology. 
A third approach, auctions, is not considered here.  Auctions are typically used 
when stable market prices are infeasible because of volatile demand and supply 
conditions (e.g., stock markets) or limited market participation (e.g., a single buyer with a 
limited number of sellers, as in government contracting, or a single seller with a limited 
number of buyers, as in art or antique auctions).  Furthermore, there is typically imperfect 
and asymmetric information so that buyers (sellers) have different views of the item’s 
true value and information about these values is limited  (McAfee and McMillan 1987).  
Of these issues, information anomalies related to differing valuations of alternative job 
assignments is the most relevant to our analysis.  While the assignment problem could be 
solved using auctions, this approach is unrealistic in most public sector labor market 
applications, the primary focus of this research, and likely in private sector internal labor 
markets as well.  These labor markets generally do not have the wage flexibility to allow 
job seekers or employers to bid for jobs or employees. 
Two-Sided Matching Markets 
A two-sided matching market (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) assigns individuals to 
jobs when there are several possible employers and job seekers. The matching algorithm 
balances the employers’ and job seekers’ preferences, but it can produce assignments that 
give priority to either employers or job seekers. As such, the algorithm specifically 
addresses both demand and supply efficiency. Two-sided matching algorithms are 
currently used in assigning medical students to residency programs (Roth and Sotomayor 
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 1990, Roth 1984, Roth and Peranson 1997) and pledges to sororities at some colleges and 
universities (Mongell and Roth 1991). 
The market for medical residents illustrates the two-sided matching system. As 
U.S. students complete their final year of medical school, they interview for residency 
positions. Each student interviews with several residency programs, and each program 
interviews several students. After the interviews, students rank residency programs 
according to their individual preferences, and programs independently rank students 
according to their preferences. Students and programs submit their prioritized lists to a 
central clearinghouse. The clearinghouse compares the lists and assigns students to 
programs. On a predetermined date, students and residency programs receive their 
assignments. Each matched student is assigned to one residency program, and each 
program is assigned students up to the number of available positions. Unmatched 
students individually seek unfilled positions; programs with unfilled positions can seek 
either unmatched U.S. medical students or foreign-trained students. 
Participating in this centralized assignment process is voluntary. Residency 
programs and medical students are free to establish individual agreements, but over 90% 
of assignments are made through this voluntary, centralized process. To generate and 
sustain this participation level, the matching process must satisfy a few basic conditions. 
One of the most important conditions is stability: both students and programs must be at 
least as happy with their assigned match as with any agreement they could reach outside 
the centralized process. The outcome is unstable if a student and program both prefer one 
another to the respective program and student with which they are centrally matched. 
With unstable matches, the student and program would both choose to forgo the assigned 
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 match and form their own agreement. If a student is not matched to his or her highest 
ranked program, the program must have been assigned students that it ranked more 
highly (i.e., the program would not reject the assigned match). If a program does not 
receive its highest ranked students, these students must be matched with programs they 
rank more highly (i.e., the students would not reject the assigned match). Roth (1991) 
describes how markets unravel when programs don’t meet these requirements. 
To summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages, as currently 
implemented for matching medical students with residency programs, the two-sided 
matching market incorporates a number of positive features of both hierarchical and 
market-based labor markets. Most importantly, unlike hierarchical systems, matching 
markets balance both employers’ and job seekers’ preferences. This improves both 
demand and supply efficiencies relative to hierarchical labor markets, and it increases 
social welfare in labor markets. Two-sided matching markets also are responsive enough 
to keep pace with active labor markets, yet periodic matching can dampen the high rates 
of employee turnover now experienced in high-technology industries. And unlike market-
based systems, two-sided matching markets provide some centralized control through the 
clearinghouse. Alternatively, two-sided matching markets lack the automatic, dynamic 
response of market-based systems, and the opportunity for side agreements to circumvent 
the system and exploit instabilities, if present, can be administratively cumbersome. 
Further, two-sided matching markets represent a centralized approach to employment 
market design, in which market participants are subject to the rules, timing and potential 
vagaries of the central-market manager. 
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 Software Agent Technology 
Work in the area of software agents has been ongoing for some time, and it 
addresses a broad array of applications (Bradshaw 1997, Franklin and Graesser 1996, 
Nissen 2001, Nwana 1996). From this array of applications, software agent technology 
has been identified as having particular promise in terms of automation and support in 
electronic labor markets (Gates and Nissen 2001). As computational artifacts, agents help 
overcome human cognitive limitations (e.g., limited memory and processing speed), and 
they support rapid search and effective filtering through huge numbers of available jobs 
and job seekers. 
Further, “intelligent” agents (i.e., possessing some artificial intelligence) can 
employ inferential mechanisms (e.g., rules, cases, scripts) to depict and consider diverse 
individuals' preferences. In a very large, public-sector enterprise, such as the U.S. Navy 
(e.g., with several hundred thousand jobs and sailors, a third of which are subject to 
personnel rotation in any given year), in which both employers and job seekers have 
specific, idiosyncratic needs and preferences, no other extant information technology 
offers the automation and support capability provided by software agents. 
Building upon prior research on distributed software agents to automate and 
support the enterprise supply chain (Nissen 2001), a similar multi-agent system called the 
Personnel Mall has been developed to enable electronic employment markets. Central to 
the Personnel Mall’s potential in this labor market domain is its ability to represent a 
multitude and wide variety of different users—on both the demand and supply sides—to 
quickly find, retrieve and organize large amounts of market information. Its conformance 
to market and organizational rules, established for a particular enterprise or circumstance, 
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 enables this multi-agent system to automate and support commerce in a broad diversity of 
electronic markets (e.g., including regulation-laden, hierarchical systems). Such ability 
suggests the Personnel Mall offers good potential to enact, automate and support the 
kinds of electronic labor markets addressed through this research. 
As its name suggests, the Personnel Mall employs a shopping-mall metaphor for 
employer/job seeker matching. In a mall, “shoppers” (e.g., employers) are not expected to 
know in advance which “shops” (e.g., job seekers) exist or what “products” (e.g., 
qualifications) they offer for sale. Neither are the job seekers expected to know a priori 
what jobs are available, nor are the employers expected to know in advance which job 
seekers may be interested in their job openings. 
 
Figure 2. Personnel Mall Screenshot 
 
The Personnel Mall employs a quasi-price system to support comparisons across 
job seekers. Job seekers use quasi-prices to quantify their relative preferences between 
alternative job assignments. A specific job seeker’s input form, as in Figure 2, lists quasi-
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 prices corresponding to the individual’s relative job preferences: lower quasi-prices 
indicate more preferred jobs. This effectively transforms the matching problem from one 
relying on ordinal scales (e.g., ranked job alternatives) to one quantifying individuals’ 
relative utilities associated with diverse jobs (e.g., using consistent numerical prices, 
ratings, scores, credits or quasi-pricing instruments).  
This is comparable to the manner in which a centralized market (e.g., stock 
exchange) uses relative prices (e.g., price per share) to compare values across diverse 
products (e.g., securities), or the manner in which job seekers express their job 
preferences in market-based labor markets by selecting between jobs based in part on 
relative wages. This aspect of the Personnel Mall compares favorably with the outcomes 
of market-based markets discussed above.  
The Personnel Mall enables employers’ agents to search across various job 
seekers in the Mall, and job seekers’ agents to search across a diversity of participating 
employers. When viewed from the employer perspective (i.e., employer agents searching 
across job seekers), for instance, the employer agent uses rules to search for and select 
the lowest “priced” job seeker(s) for each job. The Mall is always “open,” as employers 
and job seekers can launch agents to search respectively for people and jobs at any time, 
and each agent will search for the best match available in the Mall at the time. This 
mirrors the manner in which physical employment markets function (e.g., search is 
limited to market participants at the time). Where more than one alternative (e.g., job, 
person) is acceptable, the agent will select the one with the lowest quasi-price. If multiple 
acceptable alternatives have equivalent quasi-prices, then agents select the first one 
identified to break quasi-price ties (i.e., first-come-first-matched). From the perspective 
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 of the “shopping” agent, this implementation is essentially a one-sided match, which is 
most appropriate when employers/job seekers view job seekers/jobs as homogenous. 
In practice, however, this condition of homogeneity appears to be too restrictive, 
so we allow employers to have different preferences over job seekers and job seekers to 
have different preferences over employers.  This mimics a more representative 
employment market, in which employers consider both their own preferences for job 
seekers and the job seekers’ quasi-prices for that employer. Leaving all other Mall 
mechanics unchanged, agents representing one class (e.g., employers) will select the 
available agent representing the other class (e.g., job seekers) that provides the highest 
social welfare of the potential assignments available. Although the mechanics are the 
same, results may differ depending upon the market mode (i.e., whether employers are 
“shopping” for job seekers or vice versa). We report results from both market modes in 
this study.  
Overall, the Personnel Mall is subject to many of the same market principles and 
dynamics found in physical labor markets. As with two-sided matching algorithms, the 
Personnel Mall appears to offer some improvements over hierarchical planning systems 
(e.g., explicitly considers employer and job seeker preferences), and it offers advantages 
only attainable through electronic markets (e.g., provides access to and helps manage 
search through abundant, market-wide information; automates many search and matching 
tasks).  
However, as with the approaches discussed above, the Mall also suffers from 
some relative disadvantages. For instance, despite use of a quasi-pricing mechanism, the 
distributed nature of the Personnel Mall cannot guarantee that labor supply and demand 
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 will balance (e.g., markets do not always clear), and the individual-centered behavior of 
software agents using a fixed search strategy (e.g., lowest quasi-price of participating 
agents, first-come-first-matched to break quasi-pricing ties) may sacrifice global market 
efficiency to satisfy the individual preferences of employers and job seekers whose 
agents are participating in the Mall at any given time. 
TWO-SIDED ASSIGNMENT MODEL 
Testing the performance of different job assignment mechanisms requires 
measuring the goodness of fit between job seekers and jobs that have been matched with 
one another. The most relevant metric to measure fit is social welfare (i.e., the area 
between the labor supply and demand curves). The greater the social welfare, the better 
the match between employers and job seekers. Although traditional labor supply and 
demand curves can be employed to delineate supply and demand directly in market-based 
markets, they do not apply well to hierarchical labor markets (e.g., employers and job 
seekers are not homogeneous). Hence, as generally employed, this technique is limited to 
a special case, representing only a subset of labor markets. Thus, we must develop other 
labor market performance measures. 
Three metrics appear most obvious: 1) the preference rank-order of the 
assignment for the job seeker, the employer, or both; 2) the utility, or level of satisfaction 
the job seeker (employer) receives from the assigned job (job seeker); and 3) quasi-prices 
such as those employed by the Personnel Mall. Preference rank-orders are both 
measurable and comparable across job seekers and employers, but they don’t capture the 
relative strength of preferences. Utilities capture the relative strength of preferences, but 
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 in practice they are not comparable across individual job seekers or employers. Quasi-
prices are comparable across individuals, but they must be set, or adjusted, in a manner 
that reflects the relative strength of preferences.  
These empirical difficulties lead us to explore the design space of alternative 
market approaches using simulated employers and job seekers. This enables us to 
compute utility values for specific employers and job seekers in a simulated labor market, 
where utility values can be assigned to ensure comparability across job 
seekers/employers. Based on discussions with the Economic Science Laboratory at the 
University of Arizona, and following the work of Ledyard, et al. (1996) and Olson and 
Porter (1994), we report quasi-prices in place of utilities, which enables matching results 
to be summed across job seekers/employers.  These quasi-prices are equivalent to the 
prices employers (job seekers) would bid for the associated job seeker (job) under an 
incentive compatible bidding process. 
In the present case, quasi-prices are simply the inverse of the job seeker’s or 
employer’s utility values. Hence, higher utilities translate into lower quasi-prices, and 
vice versa. For job seekers, quasi-prices can be interpreted as reservation wages: the 
minimum wage required for a job seeker to accept an assignment. Lower reservation 
wages signal more preferred jobs. For employers, quasi-prices represent the cost to 
accomplish a task with a particular job seeker. Lower employer quasi-prices indicate that 
the employee in question can complete the task more efficiently (e.g., employees all 
receive the same pay per time period, but better training or personal performance allows 
some employees to complete the task more quickly).  
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 A Cobb-Douglas utility function is employed to generate utility values in this 
exploratory research. Cobb-Douglas utility functions are frequently used to represent 
individual preferences (e.g., employers, job seekers), because they correspond to the 
characteristics of consumers’ tradeoffs and demand observed in both product and labor 
(input) markets. Most importantly, Cobb-Douglas utility functions with exponents less 
than one exhibit diminishing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal utility implies that 
“consumers” (e.g., employers/job seekers) prefer more of a “good” (e.g., favorable job 
seeker/job attribute) to less, but their satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate as they 
have more of that “good” (e.g., attribute).  
Diminishing marginal utility leads to diminishing marginal rates of substitution 
(MRS) between two attributes. Substitution implies that employers/job seekers are 
willing to trade off more of one attribute for less of another; diminishing MRS implies 
that their willingness to make this trade diminishes the more they trade. As the mix of 
attributes shifts in favor of one relative to others, extra units of the more plentiful 
attribute become less valuable, while extra units of the less plentiful attributes become 
more precious. Consumer preferences typically reflect diminishing MRS (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green 1995, Ch. 3), and our utility values are computed accordingly. This 
provides a measure of realism and external validity to our simulated labor markets. 
With this well-accepted model, we generate unique utilities for all job seekers and 
employers. By systematically varying the utility functions' coefficients, two thousand 
unique utility values are generated and used to represent the preferences of various 
simulated job seekers and employers. From the 2000 utility values—1000 for job seekers 
and 1000 for employers—we randomly select ten job seekers and twelve employers. This 
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 creates a scenario with 20% over-demand for labor, which mirrors the challenging 
conditions experienced in several labor markets (e.g., IT professionals, military 
personnel, governmental employees). Clearly, using automated approaches such as 
software agents enables much larger numbers of job seekers and employers to be 
matched, but matching such large numbers exceeds the capabilities of our human 
subjects. The job seeker and employer utility functions are summarized in the Appendix. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The research design involves an exploratory experiment to assess five alternative 
designs for employment markets. Given the lack of research to date focusing specifically 
on electronic employment market design, however, the extant literature has not yet 
developed to the level at which informative market-design research hypotheses can be 
developed and tested. This is the basis for pursuing exploratory experimentation. Yet 
experimentation represents a powerful research method, one that empowers the 
investigators with substantial control over research conditions (e.g., subjects, tasks, 
environment, variables). Thus, we expect to gain a wealth of new knowledge pertaining 
to the design of electronic labor markets.  
To assess a variety of market designs, the experiment focuses specifically on the 
task of matching job seekers with job openings, for the quality of such matching 
determines the utilities of both employers and job seekers. And using our quasi-pricing 
scheme, higher utilities translate into greater social welfare from a particular labor market 
design. Additionally, we examine five different experimental conditions, each of which is 
associated with a unique market design approach, and we describe the human subjects 
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 participating in the experiment. The experimental procedure is outlined subsequently, and 
instead of formal research hypotheses, we articulate five expectations for results of the 
experiment. The experimental context is established to match that of a hierarchical labor 
market. 
Experimental Conditions 
Five experimental conditions are examined: 1) unassisted, 2) assisted, 3) 
Personnel Mall, 4) two-sided matching algorithm, and 5) optimization. The first two 
experimental conditions involve people performing the matching task, whereas the other 
three automate this task, albeit through alternative mechanisms. All conditions involve 
the identical set of twelve job openings and ten job seekers participating in the market. 
As the name implies, the unassisted condition is used to assess the performance of people 
performing the matching task with no technological or algorithmic support. This 
represents a control group, which is used for comparison with the other conditions, and 
this experimental condition corresponds with the manner in which most (hierarchical) job 
matching is currently accomplished in practice. Alternatively, subjects in the assisted 
condition use a product called Logical Decisions for Windows (Logical Decisions 1993) 
to assist them with the matching task. This tool enables multi-attribute-utility analysis, 
and it supports both graphical and numerical analysis of complex decision problems (e.g., 
involving many alternatives, attributes, performance levels). All subjects are taught to use 
this tool proficiently before the experiment. 
The third experimental condition automates the matching task through the 
Personnel Mall, which uses software agents to represent both employers and job seekers, 
and quasi-prices (i.e., inverse utilities) to represent employer and job seeker preferences.  
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 Using these quasi-prices, the Personnel Mall is run twice to reflect respective employer 
and job seeker biases.   In the former run, employer agents search for and match to job 
seekers by comparing the employer’s value for a job seeker to that job seeker’s quasi-
price for that employer.  In essence, this comparison measures the net social welfare 
generated by prospective employer/job seeker matches. Assignments are made in 
(randomly arranged) employer order; that is, Employer Agent 1 first makes its preferred 
match, then Employer Agent 2 makes its preferred match, and so forth until all ten job 
seekers are assigned. Alternatively, in the latter run, job seeker agents search for and 
match employers based on the job seeker’s preferences relative to the employers' quasi-
prices, and assignments are made in (randomly arranged) job seeker order; that is, Job 
seeker Agent 1 first makes its preferred match, then Job Seeker Agent 2 makes its 
preferred match, and so forth until all job seekers are assigned. This assignment 
methodology mimics a first-come first-served approach, which characterizes many 
public- and private-sector, hierarchical job-assignment processes.  The employer and job 
seeker biased processes where both run two hundred times, with randomized arrival 
orders for employers and job seekers, respectively. 
The fourth experimental condition automates the matching task through a two-
sided matching algorithm, which is set up to simultaneously consider the preferences of 
all employers and job seekers. It also establishes a set of matches that balances both 
employer and job seeker preferences in order to ensure stability. Like the Personnel Mall, 
the matching algorithm is run twice: first, the algorithm is used with an employer bias; 
the second run is conducted with a job seeker bias. In this specific experiment, the 
matching results from both runs are identical. This similarity in matching results is 
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 representative of people that currently participate in employment markets—hierarchical 
as well as market-based—both as job seekers and employers. Therefore, the results of 
this experiment are expected to generalize well to a broad range of employment markets 
in industry.  
Experimental Procedure 
Procedurally, the participants receive a short introduction to the matching process 
and the Personnel Mall, to familiarize them with agent technology and its potential 
application to the experimental task. Following this introduction, participants are told 
about the rationale for and nature of the experiment, and the experimental procedures are 
explained. Each participant receives an individualized package of experimental materials 
(e.g., instructions, listing of job openings, job-assignment forms), and each item is 
described. Participants are encouraged to ask questions throughout this introduction, and 
an extended period for questions and answers is included before the experiment. The 
student subjects participate in the study as a part of a graduate school class. They are 
encouraged to perform well, as results are incorporated into their course-grading scheme.  
To make the job assignments, participants are instructed to complete a simple 
form. The form lists each job and requires the subject to fill in the job seeker assigned. 
Participants are given an opportunity to ask questions pertaining to matching, the 
experiment or anything else that may be of concern or confusion. The participants’ 
reactions and comments are collected after the experiment to provide feedback for future 
experiments. 
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 Experimental Expectations 
Despite our use of exploratory experimentation in this study (e.g., absence of formal 
research hypotheses), we know enough about the different kinds of technologies and 
algorithmic capabilities associated with our experimental conditions to develop a set of 
expectations for the experiment. Specifically, considering the five experimental 
conditions, we would expect that the unassisted control group is likely to have the 
poorest matching performance (e.g., highest average quasi-prices and lowest social 
welfare). Next, we would anticipate assignment performance to increase for the assisted 
group, because the decision-support tool enables subjects to systematically capture 
preferences and compare alternatives. However, the assignments in this experimental 
condition remain bounded by the cognitive limitations and rationality of human subjects. 
Alternatively, performance for the Personnel Mall has good potential to exceed that of 
both human-subject groups, for it explicitly considers quasi-prices in its search for 
employer/job seeker matches. However, the first-come first-served assignment algorithm 
used in this experiment limits that potential. 
Assignment performance is likely to be the best for the two-sided matching and 
optimization approaches, because these approaches incorporate the batch-processing 
capability currently lacking in the Personnel Mall. Between these two algorithmic 
approaches, two-sided matching may not generate higher social welfare than the 
optimization approach, but the matches produced will be stable and hence inherently 
feasible in practice. Conversely, optimization is expected to generate the highest social 
welfare of all approaches, but it may not produce stable matches.  
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 RESULTS 
Results are summarized in Table 1. The unassisted condition reflects pooled data 
for all 80 subjects. Pooling the data establishes a sizeable control group for comparison 
with performance in the other experimental conditions. Pooling is justified in this case, 
because performance differences between the various human-subject groups are not 
statistically significant.  Similarly, results in the unassisted condition reflect pooled data. 
Notice that subjects in the control group perform better (i.e., produce lower quasi-
prices) for employers than they do for job seekers, and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 99% level. Specifically, the aggregate quasi-price for job seekers is 
$3.92, whereas subjects achieve a better aggregate of $3.48 for employers. Apparently, 
subjects have some bias toward serving employer interests above those of job seekers. 
The job matching professionals surveyed in our early pilot tests indicate that such a bias 
toward employers is very common in practice. Hence, these results are consistent with 
professional practice in employment markets and expected to generalize well beyond this 
experiment. Total quasi-price (i.e., $7.40) is calculated as the sum of quasi-prices 


















Unassisted $3.92 $3.48 $7.40 
Assisted $3.87 $3.45 $7.32 
P-Mall – Employer $3.87 $3.37 $7.24 
P-Mall – Job Seeker $3.11*** $2.99*** $6.10*** 
Matching Algorithm (both runs) $3.00*** $3.16*** $6.16*** 
Optimization – Employer $3.91 $2.52*** $6.43*** 
Optimization – Job Seeker $2.68*** $4.04*** $6.71*** 
Optimization – Combined $2.94*** $2.76*** $5.70*** 
*** Significant at 99% 
 
Subjects in the assisted condition maintain this employer bias. The aggregate 
quasi-price for job seekers is $3.87, whereas employers are scored at $3.45, though this 
difference is only significant at the 90% level. Furthermore, as expected, performance for 
this group is slightly better than exhibited by the control group, for both job seekers and 
employers, but the differences are not statistically significant. The LDW tool used in this 
assisted group helps to make relative preferences and corresponding utility values 
explicit, so subjects may obtain better insight into the tradeoffs between job seeker 
preferences, but there is no support to systematically make these tradeoffs simultaneously 
for all market participants.  
As explained above, the Personnel Mall is run for two hundred trials with both an 
employer and job seeker bias.  In employer-biased runs, the results are slightly better than 
the control case, for both job seekers and employers, but the difference is not statistically 
significant for job seekers and only significant at the 80 percent level for employers. In 
contrast, the job seeker biased runs show improvement for both job seekers and 
employers that is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.  Comparing these two 
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 variants illustrates the vagaries of a first-come-first-served assignment process in which 
there are more employers than job seekers. 
When there are more employers than job seekers, a first-come-first-served 
employer biased process will always satisfy the first ten employers that enter the system; 
the last two jobs remain unfilled and are never considered by any job seekers.  If the last 
two employers are highly desired by at least a few well-suited job seekers, overall 
assignment performance will be adversely affected.  This inefficiency is less problematic 
for the job seeker biased variant.  In this case, all ten job seekers are assigned jobs, 
regardless of their arrival order.  Furthermore, each job seeker considers all available 
jobs.  No employers are precluded from consideration with the job seeker bias. Thus, the 
job seeker biased variant should be expected to generate better overall job assignments, 
for both job seekers and employers, than the employer-biased variant. 
Considering further the relatively more efficient job seeker bias variant, 
assignment performance improved for both job seekers and employers, but job seeker 
assignment performance improved relatively more.  These trends are consistent with the 
two automation-enabled performance effects that we anticipated: automation improves 
overall efficiency and eliminates employer bias.  This indicates that the employment 
domain offers good potential for automation through the kinds of software agents 
examined in this study, though improvements in performance depend critically on the 
assignment algorithm embedded in the software agents.  In part, this dependence 
motivates the two-sided matching and optimization algorithms analyzed below.  Either of 
these algorithms could be embedded in future versions of the Personnel Mall. 
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 The matching algorithm produces lower and statistically-significant job seeker 
quasi-prices than the control group ($3.00 versus $3.92), and again this improvement for 
job seekers does not come at the expense of employers; employer quasi-prices under two-
sided matching ($3.16) are significantly lower than those of the control group ($3.48). In 
terms of Pareto optimality, the matching algorithm offers an attractive overall approach 
to job seeker/employer matching, even though total quasi-price ($6.16)—reflecting total 
utility in the market—is higher by a statistically significant margin than obtained by the 
Personnel Mall in the job seeker biased variant ($6.10).  
Finally, the results from the three optimization runs are as expected. In all three 
runs, optimization generates the lowest aggregate quasi-prices, with respect to each 
particular bias (i.e., employer, job seeker, combined), but none of the optimization runs 
generates the lowest quasi-prices across all three biases. Specifically, the employer 
optimization run provides the lowest employer quasi-prices (i.e., $2.52), but these prices 
come at the job seekers’ expense (i.e., $3.91). The job seeker optimization offers the 
lowest job seeker quasi-prices (i.e., $2.68), but they come at the employers’ expense (i.e., 
$4.04). The run optimizing combined employer/job seeker utility offers the lowest total 
quasi-price (i.e., $5.70), but not the lowest possible quasi-prices for either of the 
constituent groups. As with the matching algorithm, employers and job seekers are better 
off as a combined group under this result, and these improvements are statistically 
significant when compared to those of the control group. 
Two drawbacks to optimization, as opposed to two-sided matching, involve 
stability and data requirements.  Considering stability, optimized solutions are not 
necessarily stable. In particular, there are 15 blocking pairs in the job seeker optimization 
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 assignments; that is, there are 15 potential employer/job seeker matches where both 
parties would prefer to be matched to one another than to their assigned partner in the job 
seeker optimization result. If any of these pairs identifies one another (e.g., through 
phone inquiries or trade shows), the job seeker optimization result will unravel. 
Similarly, there are 12 blocking pairs in the employer optimization result and six in the 
combined optimization run. Thus, although these results are optimal, they are unstable. 
Hence, they may not be feasible to sustain in practice. 
Considering data requirements, optimization requires preference data for job 
seekers and employers (e.g., utility values, quasi-prices, etc.), and preference 
specifications must be comparable across job seekers or employers; two-sided matching 
only requires rank-ordered lists.  It is clearly feasible to obtain rank-ordered preference 
lists from job seekers and employers, as has been done in the U.S. medical residency 
market for over four decades; it is far from obvious that we can gather accurate, 
comparable preference data.  Thus, comparing two-sided matching and optimization 
involves trade-offs between efficiency, stability and data requirements; optimization has 
the potential to provide more efficient matches, but the solutions are likely unstable and 
entail much more demanding data requirements.   
Table 2 summarizes job seeker, employer and total social welfare for each of the 
experimental conditions; the percentage increases from the control group are shown in 
parentheses for each instance where the differences from the control group are 
statistically significant at the 99% level. The pattern of these results is the same as 
described above. Most notably, the increase in total social welfare is 9.8% for the 
matching algorithm and 13.5% for combined optimization.  If these comparative results 
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 hold as we move from an experimental setting to application in the public and private 
sectors, the absolute increase in welfare could be dramatic. Results summarized in the 
table further suggest increases in social welfare for job seekers are even more impressive 
(e.g., over 15% with two-sided matching and up to 20% with optimization). 
 












Unassisted $6.08  $6.52  $12.60  
Assisted $6.13  $6.55  $12.68  
P-Mall – Employer $6.13  $6.63  $12.76  
P-Mall – Job Seeker $6.89*** 13.4% $7.01*** 7.5% $13.90*** 10.4% 
Matching Algorithm $7.00*** 15.2% $6.84*** 4.8% $13.84*** 9.8% 
Optimization – Employer $6.09  $7.48*** 14.7% $13.57*** 7.7% 
Optimization – Job Seeker $7.32*** 20.5% $5.96*** -8.5% $13.29*** 5.5% 
Optimization – Combined $7.06*** 16.2% $7.24*** 11.0% $14.30*** 13.5% 
*** Significant at 99% 
 
According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) FY2002 budget, the U.S. 
Navy, which is currently moving from a hierarchical to a more automated assignment 
process, will spend over $20 Billion on labor in FY2002; the DoD will spend over $82 
Billion (U.S. 2002).  A shift away from unassisted matching (e.g., that increases labor 
welfare by up to 20% and total welfare by 10 - 14%) would represent a dramatic increase 
in employee morale and retention, and a significant improvement in the efficiency with 
which such public-sector enterprises use taxpayer dollars. Moreover, to the extent that 
the kinds of electronic employment market designs discussed in this technical report can 
be further extended to the private sector, the potential economic impact in terms of social 
welfare is staggering. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Most e-commerce research addresses product and service markets, but the design 
of equally important employment markets has been largely neglected in the management 
literature. This technical report builds upon multidisciplinary research in labor market 
economics and information systems, and it involves an exploratory experiment to assess 
the performance of five alternative employment market designs. Employing a quasi-price 
measure for comparison and examining social welfare as a basis for assessing market-
design alternatives, we provide novel insight into the balance required  between 
technologically enabled efficiency and economically principled effectiveness of markets. 
Additionally, this experiment addresses labor market economics in an analytically 
difficult, public-sector context, yet the market designs and associated technologies are 
quite general, so the experiment also provides insight into private-sector markets as well. 
Our results point to a Pareto superior increase in total welfare through market design, 
which can dramatically increase employee morale and retention, and increase overall 
labor market efficiency. 
Further, our results indicate that both technological and algorithmic support can 
have a profound effect on matching quality in employment markets, and these results 
point toward developing hybrid market solutions (e.g., software agents employing two-
sided matching or optimization) as a promising step for future research along the lines of 
this investigation. Even so, our experiments involve a very small, simulated labor market 
and simplistic preference functions. Promising future research could also examine large 
labor markets where preferences are diverse and based on a complicated set of job seeker 
and employer characteristics, for instance, and research to analyze the behavior of diverse 
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 physical and electronic employment markets outside of the simulator is further 
warranted.  
In terms of generalizability, our results focus on the kinds of hierarchical labor 
markets that are most common within large organizations, but nothing in our approach or 
results would seem to limit generalization across a broad range of such organizations 
(e.g., large and small, from the public and private sector). Alternatively, there is some 
question as to how well techniques such as the matching algorithm (e.g., due to the need 
for ordinal rankings) and Personnel Mall (e.g., due to the use of quasi-prices instead of 
market wage rates) would perform in the kinds of external labor markets that are 
common across organizations and industries. Although we can argue that our approaches 
and technologies should be able to generalize, it remains for a future experiment to 
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 APPENDIX – UTILITIES 
The job seeker’s individual utility is given by the following Cobb-Douglas utility 
function: 
US = Pp * Ll 
Where: 
US = Utility of job seeker 
Pp = Job seeker’s derived utility from the job’s promotion prospects 
P = Job’s index of promotion potential (job visibility) 
p = Percent change in job seeker’s utility from one percent change in 
promotion potential 
Ll = Job seeker’s derived utility from fit between job seeker’s preferred 
location (PL) and job location 
L = Job’s index of physical location relative to preferred location 
l = Percent change in job seeker’s utility from 1% change in job location 
preference 
p + l  = 1 
 
The parameter for promotion potential (P) ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest 
and 1 being the lowest chance of promotion through a particular job. Although the 1 – 5 
scale and corresponding numerical assignments are somewhat arbitrary, they are logical 
(e.g., higher values are assigned to better matches) and consistently applied (e.g., every 
match is scored in the same manner, and every parameter has the same scale). This is 
sufficient for generating a field of well-behaved utility values for the experiment. 
Similarly, job seekers specify their preferred location, and employers specify the jobs’ 
physical locations. If there is a match between locations, the Location Index (L) will be 
assigned the value of 5; otherwise L will be less than 5 (e.g., minimum value of 1), with 
the difference in value reflecting the distance between preferred and physical locations. 
The job seeker will thus derive a higher level of utility for a successful location match, 
and the closer a job’s location is to a job seeker's preference, the higher the value.  
Total utility values for each job seeker range from five (i.e., perfect job fit) to one (i.e., 
worst possible job fit). Correspondingly, individual job seeker quasi-prices range from 
$0.20 (i.e., reservation wage required to accept the perfect job in this industry) to $1.00 
(i.e., the reservation wage required to accept the worst possible job in this industry). With 
ten job seekers, the aggregate quasi-price for job seekers ranges from $2.00 to $10.00. 
This analysis also uses the difference between the job seeker’s quasi-price and the 
maximum reservation wage (i.e., $1.00) to measure the fit between the assigned job and 
the job seeker’s preferences (i.e., the job seekers’ increase in welfare from receiving a 
more preferred job). This implies that all job seekers are paid $1.00, but they would be 
willing to work for as little as $0.20 if they received their most preferred job. The 
aggregate social welfare for ten job seekers ranges from zero to $8.00. 
The employer’s individual utility is given by the following Cobb-Douglas utility 
function: 
UC = SS * Ee  
Where: 
UC = Utility of employer 
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 Ss = Employer’s derived utility from getting job seeker with skill set (S) 
S = Employer’s index of employee’s skill set relative to preferred skill set 
s = Percent change in employer’s utility from one percent change in skill set 
index 
Ee = Employer’s derived utility from getting job seeker with higher 
performance index (E)  
e = Percent change in employer’s utility from one percent change in 
performance index 
s + e = 1 
As above, a variety of employer utilities are generated to reflect a tradeoff between the 
skill set (S) of a job seeker and the job seeker's expected performance level (measured by 
an evaluation index – E). If a job seeker's skill set matches that desired by the employer 
exactly, a value of 5 is assigned; otherwise S will be less than 5 (e.g., minimum value of 
1), with the difference in value reflecting the distance between preferred and manifest 
skills. The evaluation index is developed in a similar manner. High-performance job 
seekers (e.g., with very impressive resumes and references) are scored with a value of 5, 
and lower-performance job seekers receive proportionately lower scores (e.g., minimum 
value of 1).  
As with job seekers, total utility values for each employer range from five (i.e., perfect 
job seeker fit) to one (i.e., worst possible job seeker fit). Correspondingly, individual 
employer quasi-prices range from $0.20 (i.e., the cost to complete a task with the most 
qualified job seeker) to $1.00 (i.e., the cost to complete the task with the least qualified 
job seeker). With ten jobs filled, the aggregate quasi-price for employers ranges from 
$2.00 to $10.00. This analysis uses the difference between the employer’s quasi-price 
and $1.00 to measure the fit between the assigned job and the employer’s preferences 
(i.e., the employer’s increase in welfare from receiving a more qualified job seeker). This 
implies that all job seekers are paid $1.00, but more qualified job seekers can complete 
the task in twenty percent of the time required by the least qualified job seekers (i.e., for 
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